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1. Summary  
Theoretical pathways linking transitional justice and reconciliation interventions to wider 
processes of social change remain largely implicit (Gready & Robins, 2020; Sokolić, 2020). 
Empirical studies measuring wider impacts of transitional justice and reconciliation interventions 
are also limited (Garson, 2020; Jean, 2019; McKone, 2015). A key challenge thus remains how 
to effectively move individual level transformation to the socio-political level (Sokolić, 2020). 
Research finds that while projects contribute to ‘ripple effects’ in society, it can be difficult to 
scale up successful projects (see Fairey et al., 2020; Fairey & Kerr, 2020). Relationship-building 
and dialogue, prominent in reconciliation processes and strategies, may resist standardisation, 
replication and scalability (Fairey et al., 2020). 
This rapid literature review looks at research that discusses actual or potential wider effects of 
transitional justice and reconciliation-related initiatives that extend beyond the individual 
participants. It focuses on the Western Balkans, with much of the available literature on the 
region (primarily academic and some grey literature) centred on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). 
Given the limited evidence directly on scalability, this review draws on diverse literature to outline 
pathways through which micro-level, civil-society based interventions can produce ‘ripple effects’ 
in society and scale up to affect larger geographic areas and macro-level socio-political 
outcomes (see Figure 1 for a snapshot of these linkages). The report also draws upon two prior 
K4D reports: its companion piece on ‘Transitional justice and reconciliation in the Western 
Balkans’1; and ‘Addressing societal divisions in post-conflict city settings’2.  
Pathways to wider, ‘ripple effects’ and socio-political changes 
Nationalism and conflict identities: Violent conflict stems from and produces fear, mistrust, 
dehumanisation and negative stereotypes permeating all levels of society (Garson, 2017). In the 
aftermath of war, many people remain focused on stereotypes and prejudice; and on the 
maintenance of a collective memory of victimhood (Garson, 2017; Dudai, 2012). Research on 
reconciliation initiatives finds that politicians are among the biggest barriers to sustaining 
reconciliation outcomes, fostering fear of the ‘other’, distrust and ethno-nationalist divides (Belloni 
& Ramović, 2019; Jean, 2019).  The success of transitional justice and reconciliation 
interventions in divided societies depends in large part on whether they contribute to redefining 
antagonistic collective identities and hostile relationships; and undermine support for nationalistic 
causes (Dudai, 2012). 
Transformation of conflict identities through alternative spaces and narratives: Studies of 
reconciliation interventions outline that exposure to the ‘other’, such as through shared spaces, 
inter-group dialogue and collaboration on practical issues, will produce attitudinal and 
behavioural changes associated with breaking down prejudices and stereotypes. In turn, these 
changes – and the development of cross-cutting ties – are expected to improve inter-group 
relationships (Jean, 2019; Garson, 2017; McKone, 2015). At the core of these processes is the 
insistence on going beyond the ethnicisation of victims toward shared goals and joint activism 
tackling injustices and inequalities that cut across ethno-national groups (Fridman, 2020; 
 
1 Haider, H. (2021). Transitional justice and reconciliation in the Western Balkans: approaches, impact and 
challenges. K4D Helpdesk Report 952. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
2 Haider, H. (2020). Addressing divisions in post-conflict city settings. K4D Helpdesk Report 867. Brighton, UK: 
Institute of Development Studies. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/15590  
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Fridman & Ristić, 2020). These initiatives create alternative platforms for the confrontation of 
divisive nationalism in post-conflict divided societies (Belloni, 2020; Fridman, 2020). 
Interdependence and cross-cutting ties can occur in the realms of arts, culture, economics, 
sports, and youth-oriented activities, among others (Belloni, 2020; Sokolić, 2020). The Pavarotti 
Music Centre in BiH, for example, has provided a safe space for like-minded individuals to gather 
across nationalist divides (Howell, 2018 and 2015). The ‘mirëdita, dobar dan!’ festival has 
opened the door to artists from Kosovo performing in theatres and art houses in Serbia, which 
could gradually pave the way to additional forms of normalisation (Fridman, 2020). 
Exposure to the ‘other’ can also involve discussions of the past to further break down conflict 
identities and counter macro-level, nationalist trends. Research on inter-group relations and 
reconciliation emphasises the importance of perspective taking (being able to take the 
perspective of another person) and facilitating empathy in transforming enemy images and re-
humanising the ‘other’ (Garson, 2017; Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). The development of a multi-
dimensional image of the ‘other’ is critical to the reconciliation process (Garson, 2017).  
Story-telling can help to increase empathy and mutual acknowledgment of suffering, and 
consequently contribute to the transformation of conflict identities (Garson, 2017). Recognising 
another’s victimhood, or shared suffering, helps to break down negative stereotypes (Garson, 
2017). Stories of rescuers/moral exemplars (individuals who risked their lives to help people from 
the other group) can be an effective form of story-telling and commemoration that counters 
prejudice and stereotypes (Bluestein, 2016; Dudai, 2012). Dialogue can also contribute to the 
development of alternative identities. A study of Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC) Sarajevo finds 
that the workshops contributed to the formation of a new, encompassing identity among dialogue 
participants and in many cases the discovery of shared concerns. This, in turn, fostered civic 
solidarity and civic action (see below) (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). 
The creation of peace constituencies: The transformation of conflict identities through 
reconciliation-related activities is theorised as leading to the creation of peace constituencies that 
support non-violent approaches to conflict resolution and sustainable peace (Garson, 2017). A 
global study of reconciliation projects finds that participants are seen as the future leaders of 
social change, with projects designed to give them the skills, capacity, and desire to project their 
personal transformations to their communities and the wider national society (McKone, 2015). 
This idea of a ‘ripple effect’ across society is based on the assumptions that participants will 
undergo change themselves, that they will want to change others, and that they are capable of 
creating change (McKone, 2015). The Balkans Diskurs Youth Correspondents Programme 
(BDYCP) in BiH, for example, seeks to build the capacities and voices of young civil society 
activists from all ethnic groups to produce narratives that counter divisive public discourse and 
media, which can reach a larger audience (Fairey & Kerr, 2020; Fairey, 2019).  
There is evidence that the attitudinal and behavioural changes stemming from reconciliation-
related initiatives has contributed to spin-off activities, which can have a wider impact on society 
beyond the direct participants. The Alumni Survey BiH finds that 67 percent of the respondents 
indicated that that they were engaged in further activity aimed at bringing about positive change 
to the political situation, with 89 percent of this continued activity designed for all communities 
and an estimated reach of up to several hundred thousand people (Garson 2020, 202; and 2017, 
165). In one instance, a prior participant organised a multi-ethnic Association of Former Camp 
Prisoners (prisoners of war) which grew to include over 3,000 members from Serbian, Croatian 
and Bosnian communities (Jean, 2019). Given the challenges in directly impacting the political 
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level, spin-off activities have often focused on empowering young people as the vehicles to 
eventually bring about social and political change (Garson, 2020 and 2017). 
Civic action, citizenship and protest: A key way through which projects and programmes are able 
to scale up and attain broader reach is to give participants the tools for activism, enabling them to 
become ‘multipliers of peace’ within their own communities and societies (Fairey & Kerr, 2020).  
Structured events and shared spaces can also provide the basic stepping stones for positive 
inter-group relations and free thinking and expression that can over time lead to action in the 
public sphere (Belloni, 2020). Dialogue initiatives have fostered shared identities that have in turn 
contributed to activism. NDC Sarajevo, for example, fostered a strong shared identity among 
youth in Jajce, who were able to successfully mobilise and protest against mono-ethnic schools, 
with positive outcomes (Belloni & Ramović, 2019). Research on youth memory activism in Serbia 
finds that while state officials have labelled returning ICTY convicts as heroes, activists have 
sought out alternative narratives and demanded that returning war criminals are not allowed to 
take part in electoral politics or other forms of public life (Fridman, 2018). The homecoming of 
war criminals represents a shared regional challenge and the potential for shared tactics of 
engaged citizenship (Fridman, 2018). 
The work of cultural and youth centres and other alternative spaces, alongside citizen initiatives, 
have paved the way for public manifestations of discontent in BiH (Belloni, 2020; Sircar, 2019). 
The large-scale political protests that erupted beginning from the late 2000s onwards represent 
non-ethnic mobilisations that had the effect of framing and empowering the ‘citizen’ (Belloni, 
2020; Sircar, 2019). They confirmed that many Bosnians share the same concerns, and that they 
identified elites as the main immediate cause of their misfortune, rather than the ‘other’ ethnic 
group. (Belloni, 2020; Sircar, 2019). Socio-economic protests that took place throughout BiH in 
2014 resulted in the resignation of several cantonal governments (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). 
While anti-government momentum was difficult to maintain, there is evidence that contact 
established through protesting, meetings and volunteering have helped to establish civic 
solidarity and activist networks that persist (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020; Milan, 2017).  
This has created a virtuous cycle, whereby reconciliation-related initiatives have the potential to 
contribute to civic activism, which in turn can contribute to more shared spaces and to 
reconciliation processes. Everyday acts of reconciliation embedded in a civic ethos can be 
important in preventing the recurrence of violence, reducing inflammatory ethno-nationalist 
practices, and promoting inter-group reconciliation (Visoka, 2020). At the horizontal dimension, 
grassroots level, socioeconomic protests build civic solidarity through socialisation and shared 
aspirations; at the vertical dimension, activists build solidarity because they are pitted against a 
ruling elite that fails to address their economic concerns (Lai, 2020). 
Vertical linkages, sustainability and wider geographic reach 
Structure, institutions and electoral changes: A key outcome of the 2014 protests was their quick 
evolution into plenums (informal, inclusive citizens-led councils) throughout the country (Belloni, 
2020; Lai, 2020; Milan, 2017). Plenums constituted another opportunity for inter-ethnic contact as 
ordinary citizens; and served as an alternative public sphere in which criticising ethnic elites was 
possible (Lai, 2020; Puljek-Shank & Fritsch, 2019; Milan, 2017). In order to promote the 
sustainability of interventions, NDC Sarajevo’s dialogue initiative similarly allowed for crucial 
follow-up in the form of financial support for community actions and the establishment of multi-
ethnic coordination bodies and action groups (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). 
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Socio-political change in the Western Balkans requires a growing critical mass which sees the 
merit in progressive and conciliatory ethnic politics and is capable of side-lining divisive ethno-
nationalist forces through electoral processes (Visoka, 2020; Garson, 2020).  A recent study on 
the protests in BiH finds evidence of a causal link between the 2014 plenums and voting 
behaviour – demonstrating the possibility for citizen-led mobilisation to trigger electoral change 
(Sircar, 2019). 
The media: Media activities are particularly geared to reaching a wide audience, across multiple 
communities and regions, exposing them to themes of tolerance and cooperation (Jean, 2019; 
McKone, 2015). Documentary film projects, for example, have reported on successful 
reconciliation processes and portrayed people doing something different and more positive than 
their negative stereotypes, such as the portrayal of moral exemplars (McKone, 2015). Media 
attention to positive stories of the relationships forged through reconciliation-related initiatives 
can also create momentum for sustainable change (Dorokhina et al., 2011). Findings from a 
Worlds of Journalism (WJS) study suggest that journalists and editors in Albania, Croatia, 
Kosovo and Serbia perceive journalism as embodying not only values of objectivity, but also 
advocacy for social change (Andresen et al., 2017).  
New online platforms and forms of social media provide the potential for active citizenship and for 
a more inclusive society (Fairey & Kerr, 2020; Howell, 2015). The #whitearmbandday social 
media campaign and online commemoration, initiated by a group of local activists, successfully 
mobilised a transnational memory network to combat denial of crimes committed in Prijedor in 
1992 (Fridman & Ristić, 2020; Paul, 2020). As the online commemoration gained more visibility, 
traditional media continually reported on the events, which further enhanced the visibility of 
commemorations (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). Research on #whitearmbandday finds that this form 
of online transnational commemoration has involved thousands of people across borders, 
languages, and ethno-nationalities and created the space for alternative memories of war that 
transcend ethnicisation of victims (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). By adopting the same message and 
the same hashtag in this and other online and onsite actions, youth memory activists highlight 
that theirs is not only a national struggle but a regional one (Fridman, 2021). Online memory 
activism thus has the potential to support broader regional change (Fridman & Ristić, 2020).  
Involvement of local leaders: In order to achieve genuine, sustainable social or political change, 
civil society-based activities need to connect with the policies and processes at higher 
institutional, decision-making and leadership levels (Garson, 2017; McKone, 2015). The theory of 
change presented here is that if community leaders can come to understand multi-perspective 
narratives and experiences through reconciliation-related initiatives, they can set a precedent for 
positive inter-group interaction (Jean, 2019; McKone, 2015). 
The involvement of key influencing people and institutions can thus be an important factor in the 
design and success of initiatives (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). NDC Sarajevo, for example, got 
buy-in from municipality councillors of all three major ethnic groups, which enhanced the 
credibility and trustworthiness of – and support given to – the organisation and its programming 
(Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). Also, in BiH, the permission-seeking process of The Rescuers (an 
internationally touring exhibition) became a mechanism for forging stronger relationships with 
local governments, including mayoral offices, (Wahlin & Kahn, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Pathways to socio-political change produced by transitional justice and 
reconciliation-related initiatives 
 
Source: the Author, based in part on Garson, 2017, 55. 
2. Background 
The evidence 
Pathways linking transitional justice and reconciliation interventions to wider processes of social 
change remain largely implicit (Gready & Robins, 2020; Sokolić, 2020). These linkages and 
processes remain undertheorised in the literature (Sokolić, 2020). Theories of change are often 
normative, with the benefits of interventions presented as self-evident (Gready & Robins, 
2020).  While there is evidence of such interventions contributing to transformations in attitudes, 
perceptions and trust of participating individuals, such personal transformations need to translate 
into actions at the public, political and institutional level in order to have a sustainable impact on 
peace (McAuliffe, 2017). A key challenge remains how to effectively move individual level 
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transformation to the socio-political level (Sokolić, 2020). Attention to relationship-building 
and dialogue in reconciliation processes and strategies may resist standardisation, 
replication and scalability (Fairey et al., 2020). 
Empirical studies measuring wider impacts of transitional justice and reconciliation interventions 
are limited (Garson, 2020). Existing evaluations have been criticised for over-reliance on 
participant testimonies that claim significant impact, but that are difficult to verify beyond these 
participant accounts (Fairey et al., 2020). There is also a tendency to focus on short-term 
outputs, rather than longer-term outcomes, and a failure to establish convincing causal links to 
wider societal and political impacts (Fairey et al., 2020).  
A review of 277 reconciliation projects implemented across the globe (‘Study A’) finds that most 
intervention strategies focus on early-stage reconciliation, due possibly to limited funding or to 
assumptions that reconciliation will naturally develop over time (McKone, 2015). A subsequent 
review of evaluations of reconciliation programmes in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe 
(‘Study B’) also reveals a lack of evidence of sustained results over time (Jean, 2019). While 
there are many assumptions in project designs and theories of change that wider impacts 
will happen, there is very little evidence of this reported in evaluations (Jean, 2019). 
Assessments of wider impacts could include measurements of whether participants go on to 
develop their own initiatives; subsequent ability to resist provocation to violence; and reduction of 
threat of violence (Garson, 2020). Micro-level interventions, such as arts-based projects, can 
contribute to such ‘ripple effects’ or multiplier impacts (Fairey et al., 2020). An effective theory of 
change for transitional justice and reconciliation must be able to link different levels in societies in 
ways that extend beyond a vague hope of wider change (Gready & Robins, 2020). 
Nationalism and conflict identities 
Violent conflict is an inter-societal process with fear, mistrust, dehumanisation, demonisation and 
negative stereotypes permeating all levels of society (Garson, 2017). These extended processes 
result in a lack of empathy that makes it easier to mistreat others (Garson, 2017). In the 
aftermath of war, many people remain focused on stereotypes and prejudice, having lost 
the ability to individualise the ‘enemy’ (Dudai, 2012).  Fear, mistrust, and stereotyping can 
reignite violence or continue patterns of exclusion (Dudai, 2012).  
A focus on victimhood and the maintenance of a collective memory of victimhood can also 
undermine recognition of one’s own ethno-national group’s wrong-doings and block information 
about the humanity of the ‘enemy’ (Bar-Tal, 2013; cited in Garson, 2017). The emotional and 
political attachment to one’s own group is reinforced by political elites who exaggerate the fear of 
the ‘other’ and foster distrust in order to maintain power (Belloni & Ramović, 2019). Divisions are 
also entrenched through education policy and the instrumental use of memorial sites and state 
symbols in order to support the nationalist cause (Belloni & Ramović, 2019).  
Research on reconciliation initiatives finds that politicians are among the biggest barriers 
to sustaining reconciliation outcomes (Jean, 2019). Academics, practitioners, and participants 
in reconciliation programmes have noted the extreme difficulty in trying to promote positive inter-
group relationships and to create a ‘ripple effect’ from reconciliation activity when the political 
dynamic reinforces fear and divisions in the populations (Parent, 2019; Garson, 2017). A study of 
youth in BiH finds that they often have a one-sided view of the wars, due in large part to lack of 
knowledge, a biased media and nationalist politicians (Parent, 2019). 
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The success of transitional justice and reconciliation interventions in divided societies – 
and their ability to achieve wider change – depends in large part on whether they contribute 
to redefining these antagonistic collective identities and hostile relationships; and 
undermine support for nationalistic causes (see Figure 2) (Garson, 2017; Dudai, 2012). 
Comprehensive research on joint reconciliation activities in BiH, Northern Ireland and Israel-
Palestine finds that the effectiveness of such programmes relies in large part on identity change 
resulting from increased inter-group contact (Garson, 2017). This, in turn, reduces entrenched 
fear and allows for the development of empathy and rehumanisation of the ‘other’ (Garson, 
2017). A societal climate where the politics of division are not encouraged, and where the 
dominant sentiment shifts from hostility to solidarity, can provide the space for positive inter-
group contacts to occur more freely and spontaneously (from the ground up) (Parent, 2019). 
See: Figure 2: The link between reconciliation activities and the development of peace 
constituencies and stable peace, Source: Garson, 2017, p. 55, 
https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1575677/1/Garson%20FINAL%20%20printer%2017%20May.pdf  
3. Alternative spaces and informal processes 
Bottom-up peace initiatives and ‘everyday peace’ creates alternative platforms for peace 
formation and the confrontation of nationalism in post-conflict divided societies (Fridman, 2020). 
At the core of these alternative spaces is the insistence on going beyond the ethnicisation 
of victims towards commonalities and joint activism tackling past injustices and current 
inequalities that cut across ethno-national groups (Fridman, 2020; Fridman & Ristić, 2020). 
Opportunities to work on common interests, including economic challenges, allows for 
improvement in inter-group relations by fostering greater trust and reducing fear of the ‘other’ 
(Parent, 2019). Political discourses countering divisive elites have also emerged in such 
alternative spaces (Belloni, 2020). 
Studies A and B outline a theory of change for reconciliation interventions in relation to exposure 
to the ‘other’, drawn from Search for Common Ground’s theory of Healthy Relationships and 
Connections (Jean, 2019; McKone, 2015; Church & Rogers, 2006). The premise is that 
exposure to the ‘other’, through shared spaces, inter-group dialogue, and collaboration 
on practical issues, among other forms of exposure, will produce the attitudinal and 
behavioural changes associated with breaking down prejudices and stereotypes. In turn, 
these changes are expected to improve inter-group relationships, which will support the 
deepening of reconciliation and sustainable peace (McKone, 2015). Sustaining cross-cutting 
relationships and networks over time, and at all levels of society, is considered essential for 
developing support for peace and inter-group reconciliation (Lederach, 1997; cited in Sokolić, 
2020; Garson, 2017).  
Interdependence and cross-cutting ties can occur in the realms of arts, culture, politics, 
economics, sports, and youth-oriented activities, among others, that are free of the 
normative burden of ‘reconciliation’ (Belloni, 2020; Sokolić, 2020). In the case of arts and culture, 
for example, the understanding is that if writers, dramatists and filmmakers produce stories and 
cultural content that humanise the ‘other’ and support relationship-building across the divide, 
audience members will seek to emulate these attitudes and behaviours (Jean, 2019). This, in 
turn, could produce actual transformation in attitudes and behaviour and promote tolerance and 
positive views of differences on a broader societal scale (Jean, 2019). 
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There are no expectations associated with how interactions ought to look like in these alternative 
and informal spaces (Sokolić, 2020). In BiH, these spaces, particularly cultural and youth 
centres, have provided for key contact with the ‘other’ and served as microcosms of protest and 
avenues to counter elite discourses (Belloni, 2020). The Pavarotti Music Centre, for example, 
planned by War Child, opened in Mostar in 1997, funded through private donations and 
fundraising, most significantly from Italian opera singer Luciano Pavarotti. The project aimed to 
bring relief to residents of Mostar and others in BiH through music education and training, music 
therapy, and recreational and cultural activities (Howell, 2018). The Centre offers a range of in-
house learning opportunities for young people in various musical genres (e.g. rock, African 
drumming).  
Interviews with diverse people close to the Centre’s projects reveal that the Centre has provided 
a key contact place – a safe space for like-minded individuals to gather across nationalist 
divides. It offers an idea of normality – that it is possible to meet youth from other ethno-national 
backgrounds, who they have been told to fear and hate – and to do things together, to make and 
create music (Howell, 2018 and 2015). Others from throughout the region have also been 
curious to go there to see what is on offer, widening the potential impacts of the Centre beyond 
Mostar (Howell, 2018 and 2015). 
Study A finds that public events, such as arts festivals that can draw large audiences from 
divided communities, can set a precedent for further interaction that improves tolerance 
and cooperation necessary to deepen and widen reconciliation (McKone, 2015). The 
‘mirëdita, dobar dan!’ festival, for example, is a bottom–up, civil society-based initiative aimed at 
transforming Serbia–Kosovo relations through people-to-people exchanges across conflict 
groups with the aim of countering negative portrayals of Albanians from Kosovo (Fridman, 2020). 
The festival brings live music, plays, and documentary and feature films from Kosovo to various 
locations in Belgrade. There are also roundtable discussions that tackle topics and themes that 
would often otherwise not be addressed, such as the legacies and the consequences of the 
1998–1999 war in Kosovo, including the issue of wartime sexual violence. Albanian and Serbian 
are both official languages of the festival, with simultaneous translations in both languages 
(Fridman, 2020). 
A recent study focused on perceptions in Serbia of mirëdita, dobar dan! and festival activities in 
Belgrade finds that such activist forms of everyday peacebuilding diplomacy can challenge and 
contest the role of ethno-national categories and elite nationalisms (Fridman, 2020). 
Performances by Kosovar artists at the Belgrade Philharmonic Orchestra house, for example, 
had large turnouts – opening the door to artists from Kosovo being invited directly by theatres 
and art houses in Serbia. This could gradually pave the way to additional forms of normalisation 
(Fridman, 2020). 
A case study of Most Mira’s Youth Arts Festival in the northwest region of BiH entailed three 
days of various forms of art (e.g. theatre, film-making, and dance), involving children from 
different schools. An evaluation report, which included a survey for teachers and volunteers and 
small focus group discussions and a collaborative body mapping exercise for youth participants, 
highlights the success of the festival in building tolerance and friendships; and promoting wide 
participation (see McKone, 2015).  
At the same time, a key limitation of these events, similar to other initiatives aimed at 
bridging divides is that the reach may be limited to the ‘already converted’ - to those 
already engaged in anti-nationalist peace activism or those who already hold views supportive of 
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coexistence (Fridman, 2020). Further, the mirëdita, dobar dan! festival, held annually, has 
drawnprotests from nationalist actors and led to clashes between ultra-nationalist and anti-
nationalist actors (Fridman, 2020). Divisive macro-level environments can constrain the ability of 
individuals to continue to explore peaceful coexistence beyond the safe shared spaces (Howell, 
2015). Still, the mere presence of these alternative options maintains the potential for active, 
critical citizenship and the potential for a more diverse, inclusive society (Howell, 2015). 
Breaking down conflict identities and countering nationalist trends 
Antagonistic conflict identities that are bred during the conflict, through stereotypes, mistrust and 
fear, must be transformed to one in which parties can recognise and celebrate each other’s 
differences and envision a shared future in spite of those differences (Garson, 2017). This is 
necessary in order to break cycles of intractable conflict and to promote reconciliation and 
sustainable peace (Garson, 2017; Dudai, 2012). There is a growing need to deepen our 
understanding of the ways in which top‐down and everyday nationalism can be 
challenged through micro-level reconciliation and peacebuilding initiatives and through 
local forms of agency for peace (Fridman, 2020). 
Social-psychological literature and empirical research on inter-group relations and reconciliation 
emphasise the importance of perspective taking and facilitating empathy in transforming 
enemy images and rehumanising the ‘other’ (Garson, 2017; Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). The 
development of a new, multi-dimensional image of the other, that goes beyond a stereotype 
associated with an ethnic label and an appreciation of the differences between individuals is a 
critical aspect of the reconciliation process (Garson, 2017). 
The Alumni Survey BiH demonstrates that participation has facilitated a softening of conflict 
identities (Garson, 2017). Study B finds that attitudinal changes were reported in 15 out of 36 
evaluations, including greater acceptance of members of other ethnic groups (Jean, 2019). 
Story-telling can help to increase empathy and mutual acknowledgment of suffering, and 
consequently contribute to the transformation of conflict identities (Garson, 2017). The 
Alumni Survey BiH reveals, similar to surveys conducted in Israel-Palestine and Northern Ireland, 
that respondents felt that the most valuable element of the activities was ‘hearing other people’s 
stories/experiences’ (81 percent of respondents), in addition to having the opportunity to tell their 
own story (48 percent), thus seeking the empathy of the other participants (Garson, 2017, 159). 
Recognising another’s victimhood, or shared suffering, humanises the ‘other’, helping to break 
the perpetuated negative stereotypes (Garson, 2017). 
The use of stories of rescuers/moral exemplars by journalists, truth commissions, archivists, 
museums, artists and others, to commemorate rescuers and their activities can be an effective 
form of story-telling and commemoration (Bluestein, 2016). Research finds that commemorating 
rescuers, and disseminating stories of rescue, can counter prejudice, individualise rather than 
stereotype the ‘other’, and rehumanise inter-ethnic perceptions – all of which can facilitate 
reconciliation (Blustein, 2016; Dudai, 2012). This is the other side of individualising guilt—
blaming individuals rather than whole ethnic groups, which is a key goal of prosecutions of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (Dudai, 2012).  Both processes seek to counter collective 
blame and collective attitudes; and to create alternative narratives about past conflict 
(Dudai, 2012). Rescuer stories can also help to neutralise criticism of victims who are attacked 
for seeking reconciliation with former enemies (Dudai, 2012). 
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Rescuers may, however, be framed as an exception, with their positive actions used only to 
reinforce prejudice against the majority in their community (Blustein, 2016; Dudai, 2012). As such, 
it is important to be able to uncover and disseminate a substantial number of such stories to 
demonstrate that they are not outliers, but rather relatively common behaviour in the out-group 
(Čehajić‐Clancy & Bilewicz, 2020). Stories of help and rescue during the war are still not well 
known or widespread in BiH and elsewhere in the Western Balkans, however, due in large part to 
the limited interest public authorities have generally shown in supporting these initiatives or in 
developing activities themselves (Moll, 2020). 
Research on rescuers finds that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) missed an opportunity to uncover and widely disseminate stories of rescuers/moral 
exemplars, which could have played an effective role in challenging conflict identities on a larger 
scale (Dudai, 2012). In one instance, it discovered and investigated the story of four young 
Bosniaks who managed to flee the massacre in Srebrenica and were subsequently helped by 
two Serbs who came across them. They provided the Bosniaks with shelter, food and directions 
to a safer region. The survivors were later captured and killed by Serb forces; and their rescuers 
were also caught by the Serb military police and prosecuted by the wartime Serb authority for 
‘aiding the enemy’ (Dudai, 2012).  
This powerful rescue story was discovered only incidentally and then relegated to a footnote in 
ICTY supporting materials for the prosecution of Drago Nikolić, a Bosnian-Serb army commander 
involved in the genocide in Srebrenica (Dudai, 2012). Refik Hodzic, an ICTY outreach officer and 
film-maker, came across the footnote and investigated the story, which resulted in the 
documentary film, Statement 710399 (Dudai, 2012). If even a small portion of the ICTY’s 
resources had been spent on proactively searching for rescue stories, many more would have 
been found (Dudai, 2012).  
Dialogue also has the potential to contribute not only to personal change but also to the 
development of alternative identities and broader socio-political changes. This is the 
approach adopted by NDC Sarajevo, which works in ethnically divided communities in BiH with 
the aim of rebuilding a functional society (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). A key aspect in the design 
of NDC Sarajevo’s dialogue initiative has been a model of engagement that combines inter-group 
dialogue with support for local activism (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019).   
Through a series of individual and group semi-structured interviews spanning 2012-2017 (with 
staff, the workshop facilitator, diverse participants and members of local action groups), a recent 
study of NDC Sarajevo finds that the Centre has created a viable model that contributes to de-
ethnicising the everyday problems that local communities experience (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). 
Workshops examined in this study took place in cities – Zvornik and Jajce and in rural towns - 
Srebrenica and Bratunac.  
The same study finds that the dialogue workshops contributed to the crucial formation of a 
new, encompassing identity among dialogue participants and in many cases the 
discovery of shared concerns. In the case of Jajce, youth participants started to refer to 
themselves as the ‘Nansen kids’, forming an encompassing identity that allowed participation of 
all ethnic groups (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). These alternative identities are effective in 
countering the salience placed on ethnicity and can also contribute to participants seeing the 
‘other’ in a different light. It is also in Jajce that students – direct and indirect beneficiaries of the 
Nansen dialogue processes – successfully initiated protests against the plans of the cantonal 
government to divide the now-multi-ethnic secondary education along ethnic lines, wanting 
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instead to be educated together (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). The government ultimately dropped 
their plans. Similarly, NDC Skopje facilitated dialogue seminars among Albanian and 
Macedonian communities that led to the identification of a shared concern for better education, 
regardless of ethnicity (Kelleher and Ryan, 2012).  
4. Peace constituencies 
The transformation of conflict identities through reconciliation-related activities is 
theorised as leading to the creation of cross-cutting networks and peace constituencies 
that support more peaceful approaches to conflict resolution and sustainable peace (Garson, 
2017). The Individual Change Theory, articulated by Search for Common Ground, specifies that 
peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals – their 
attitudes, behaviours and skills, for example through investment in individual change through 
training and dialogue workshops (Church & Rogers, 2006). 
Research, based on process tracing, finds that participation in reconciliation activities has a 
role in transforming antagonistic attitudes and identities into those that support peaceful 
conflict resolution (Garson, 2017). In the case of BiH, although individuals and organisations 
have had limited impact in being able to effect change on the political level, there is the potential 
that encouraging attitude change and reconciliation could aid in the formation of peace 
constituencies. In turn, given the right circumstances, peace constituencies could eventually 
challenge divisive elite-driven politics (Garson, 2017). At the same time, however, the potential 
of peace constituencies is significantly hampered by lack of institutional support (Garson, 
2020). 
Study A finds that reconciliation projects, such as dialogue initiatives, connected grassroots work 
to shifts in attitudes and behaviours at the community and national levels (McKone, 2015). 
Projects often conceived of participants as the future leaders of social change, with the aim of 
giving them the skills, capacity, and desire to project their personal transformations to their 
communities and the wider national society (McKone, 2015). This idea of a ‘ripple effect’ 
across society is based on the assumptions that participants will undergo change 
themselves, that they will want to change others, and that they are capable of creating 
change (McKone, 2015). The theory of change behind this outcome is that if participants in 
reconciliation activities are able to trust and empathise with people from across group divides, 
they will become leaders who will promote positive inter-group relations in their communities and 
broader society, which in turn will produce a more peaceful, inclusive, and tolerant society 
(McKone, 2015). Study B finds that beyond attitudinal change, there were examples of personal 
commitment and behaviour change on behalf of project participants, including the willingness to 
listen to others and engage in perspective taking, to respect and value differences, and to 
cooperate and collaborate across divides (Jean, 2019).  
Peace constituencies that advocate support for peaceful resolution of the conflict remains a key 
element in establishing the effectiveness of reconciliation programmes and the direct impact of 
its alumni (Garson, 2017). The Alumni Survey in BiH reveals that 89 percent of the participants 
would recommend participation in a joint reconciliation programme to others, with 94 percent of 
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the respondents indicating that they stayed in touch with participants from the programme3 
(Garson, 2020, 202). 
Research on the BDYCP, which runs annually with new participants, finds that it has successfully 
amplified and extended the profiles and networks of its active participants as cultural actors, 
media professionals and young peacebuilders (Fairey & Kerr, 2020). Led by the peacebuilding 
NGO Post Conflict Research Centre (PCRC), it seeks to catalyse new forms of participatory 
youth-produced visual and digital media in order to build an inclusive civil society. It seeks to 
build the capacities and voices of young civil society activists from all ethnic groups to challenge 
the ways in which they have been taught to think, to enter into dialogue with others, and to 
produce narratives that counter divisive public discourse and media (Fairey & Kerr, 2020; Fairey, 
2019).  
While not framed as a peacebuilding or reconciliation project, the programme strengthened 
participants’ levels of trust in other ethnic groups; positive attitudes toward inter-ethnic 
collaboration and reconciliation; and resolve and ability to engage in civil society and work 
towards durable peace (Fairey & Kerr, 2020). As such, the programme can be seen as 
expanding their capacities as ‘active citizens’ to influence and become ‘multipliers of peace’ from 
within their own societies and peer groups (Fairey & Kerr, 2020).  
The PCRC’s Ordinary Heroes programme, from which the BDYCP evolved, utilises international 
stories of rescuer behaviour and moral courage to promote reconciliation and inter-ethnic 
cooperation among Bosnian-Herzegovinian youth in particular. After a viewing of one of the 
Ordinary Heroes documentaries during the workshops, the programme participants’ discussion 
demonstrated an active engagement and nuanced understanding of the concept of moral 
courage and the important role it plays in building peace and coexistence. Seven participants 
went on to enter stories (11 articles in total) in the Srđan Aleksić Youth Competition that focuses 
on stories of moral courage, celebrating individuals, networks and organisations that challenge 
divisive politics and narratives. These stories were recently published on the Balkan Diskurs 
website, thus spreading their messages of peace (Fairey, 2019). 
Spin-off activities 
The attitudinal and behavioural changes stemming from reconciliation-related initiatives 
can contribute to spin-off activities, which can have a wider impact on society beyond the 
impact on direct participants. Study B finds, for example, that one participant, after accepting 
the possibility of living and working with the ‘other’, organised a multi-ethnic Association of 
Former Camp Prisoners which grew to include over 3,000 members from Serbian, Croatian and 
Bosnian communities (Jean, 2019).  
The Alumni Survey BiH finds that 67 percent of the respondents indicated that that they were 
engaged in further activity aimed at bringing about positive change to the political situation, with 
89 percent of this continued activity designed for all communities and an estimated reach of up to 
several hundred thousand people (Garson 2020, 202; and 2017, 165). These spin-off 
programmes cover a range of initiatives related to reconciliation and transitional justice, including 
 
3 Seventy-five percent of the respondents remained in touch with former participants from both their own and 
other groups. 
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work with victims and camp survivors, sports clubs and joint activist networks (Garson 2020, and 
2017). 
Only 17 percent of these spin-off activities were aimed at politicians and government officials, 
however, with documented frustration at not being able to impact the elite level sufficiently 
(Garson, 2020, 202; and 2017, 165). Given the challenges in directly impacting the political level, 
a number of respondents identified that their spin-off activities focused on empowering youth as 
the vehicles to eventually bring about social and political change (Garson, 2020 and 2017). 
The interactions, friendships and social networks fostered at the Pavarotti Music Centre among 
young people have had a ‘snowball effect’, increasing the scale of impact on cultural life in 
Mostar and on countering divisions (Howell, 2015). Some groups began to generate new artistic 
projects together, becoming cultural producers and building opportunities for others, often 
younger generations to become involved in urban culture. One group of friends went on to 
establish a much-loved bar and arts venue (the Alternative Institute) in the centre of town. This 
venue has sought to explore an alternative culture away from the rigid confines of politically-
imposed cultural identities (Howell, 2015). Members of the Alternative Institute then went on to 
found the Abrašević Youth Cultural Centre, which continues to engage in important work, 
breaking down and providing alternative narratives to life in Mostar. While it is challenging for 
such cultural and arts-based projects to effectively counter the pervasive political 
nationalist rhetoric in the city and country, the presence of such alternative spaces, 
options and narratives enables individuals to collaboratively imagine alternative lives 
(Howell, 2015). This can create the potential for active, critical citizenship that enriches the 
cultural life of other citizens and highlights the possibility of a more plural, diverse society to other 
segments of the population (Howell, 2015). 
Participants in the BDYCP also continued their activism beyond the direct project activities 
through PCRC led and self-generated opportunities. For example, one participant successfully 
produced a photography exhibit on stereotypes and discriminatory practices against BiH’s Roma 
population. It received funding from other sources and was able to tour across BiH (Fairey, 
2019). Further, the networks fostered by the programme among participants amplified their own 
self-directed civil society activities and work as media producers. It also exposed them to new 
opportunities and ideas, creating a ‘ripple effect’ beyond the programme’s direct impact (Fairey, 
2019). 
5. Civic action and citizenship  
Structured events and shared spaces can provide the basic stepping stones for positive 
inter-group relations and free thinking and expression that is largely absent in the political 
realm in the Western Balkans (Belloni, 2020). A key way through which projects and 
programmes are able to scale up and attain broader reach is to give participants the tools for 
activism, enabling them to become ‘multipliers of peace’ within their own communities and 
societies (Fairey & Kerr, 2020). These foundations, activities and tools can eventually infiltrate 
into the public sphere in the form civic activism (Belloni, 2020).  
Cultural and youth centres, for example, have brought together and mobilised young 
people beyond the nationalist discourses, fostering cooperation along common interests 
–e.g. debate, cinema, music, among other activities (Belloni, 2020). Inter-ethnic interactions can 
be considered positive when they result in civic solidarity, involving ‘a forward-looking 
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commitment to fighting for social justice and against the privileges of political elites’ (Lai, 2020, 
180).  As part of efforts to foster dialogue, tolerance, and reconciliation, many youth-focused 
peacebuilding efforts emphasise leadership, addressing local problems relevant to youth, and 
working on achieving solutions (Hammett and Marshall, 2017). Such initiatives that motivate 
youth to actively involve themselves in civil society are considered to play an important role in 
creating peaceful, tolerant and productive citizens, building an inclusive society, and enhancing 
trust between individuals and government bodies (Fairy, 2019; Hammett and Marshall, 2017). 
The BDYCP project, beyond amplifying the capacities, networks and skills of participants to work 
as peacebuilders, also served to solidify their identities as youth activists and to re-affirm the 
value of their efforts (Fairey, 2019).  By the end of the project, all the participants felt strongly 
about the crucial role that young people had to play in building a better future for BiH, while at the 
same time being cognisant about the challenges they face to affect meaningful social change 
(Fairey, 2019). 
Youth activists, members of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR)4, have been involved in 
activism related to contested memories in Serbia of the wars of the 1990s (Fridman, 2018). 
Memory activism has emerged as a continuation of the anti-war activism of the 1990s and post-
2000 peace activism. Research on memory activism in Serbia finds that while state officials have 
labelled returning ICTY convicts as heroes, youth activists have sought out alternative production 
of knowledge and demanded that returning war criminals should not be taking part in public life 
(Fridman, 2018). They approach the knowledge produced in the ICTY trials as facts that cannot 
be denied but rather confronted and debated (Fridman, 2018). Their acts of memory activism can 
be interpreted as political, constituting forms of engaged citizenship (Fridman, 2018). 
The activists opted for confrontational tactics when some of the released convicts began 
appearing at public events and election campaigns in public spaces, promoting their memoirs, 
sharing their experiences, and openly negating crimes for which they were convicted (Fridman, 
2018). In 2016, for example, activists obstructed a roundtable event in Dom Omladine (Belgrade 
Youth Centre) in downtown Belgrade, which sought to promote a book by Momčilo Krajišnik, the 
former Bosnian Serb parliament speaker, who was convicted by the ICTY for the persecution and 
deportation of Bosniak and Croat civilians from 10 Bosnian municipalities5 (Fridman, 2018). In 
2017, activists attempted to obstruct a public debate in Vojvodina featuring Veselin Šljivančanin, 
a former officer in the Yugoslav People’s Army, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for his 
role in the 1991 war in Croatia in the Ovčara farm massacre (near Vukovar)6 (Fridman, 2018). In 
both cases, the events continued as planned once the activists were removed from the spaces. 
The actions of the youth memory activists received broad public exposure, becoming a topic of 
debate in the media and social networks for days after and receiving support and criticism 
(Fridman, 2018).  
 
4 This regional NGO was first formed in Belgrade (Serbia) in 2004 and now has offices in Prishtina (Kosovo), 
Zagreb (Croatia), Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Podgorica (Montenegro). 
5 Krajišnik was released in September 2013 after serving two thirds of his 20-year sentence. Activists entered the 
public event that day, and as soon as Krajišnik was given the stage to speak, they began blowing their whistles, 
preventing him from talking. Outside the building, another group of activists stood with banners stating, ‘Home of 
the Criminals of Belgrade’. 
6 Šljivančanin was released early by the ICTY July 2011. The activists entered the hall as audience members, 
and as soon as Šljivančanin was about to begin his speech, they began blowing their whistles. 
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Similar to the first generation of memory activists, contemporary youth memory activists 
emphasise the importance of preserving and building regional connections in order to 
effectively fight against denial and distortion of the violent legacies of the 1990s (Fridman, 
2018). This cause is centred on truth-seeking and justice and downplays ethnic categorisation of 
victims and perpetrators (Fridman, 2018). The homecoming of war criminals represents a shared 
challenge and the potential for shared tactics of engaged citizenship (Fridman, 2018). 
Dialogue initiatives have also fostered shared identities that have in turn contributed to activism. 
NDC Sarajevo, for example, fostered a strong shared identity among youth in Jajce (the ‘Nansen 
kids’), who were able to successfully mobilise and protest repeatedly against mono-ethnic 
schools in the city in 2016-2017 (Belloni & Ramović, 2019). Their protests resulted in the 
decision of the Ministry of Education of Central Bosnia Canton to suspend the establishment of a 
new, exclusively Bosniak school (Belloni & Ramović, 2019). 
Large scale political protests 
Viewing protests as a site of reconciliation activity is informed by an awareness of the importance 
of informal activities for the sustainability of reconciliation (Lai, 2020). Protests can be more 
visible and accessible to the public than organised events (Lai, 2020). Despite their potential for 
drawing people together in fighting for a shared cause across societal divisions, the 
contribution of protests to reconciliation remains underexplored in the literature on 
informal activities in divided societies (see Lai, 2020).  
Protests facilitate the emergence not only of new forms of activism, but also of new kinds of 
citizenship (Lai, 2020). Protests can build civic solidarity though the combination of (1.) symbolic 
and physical mixing that occurs during demonstrations for socioeconomic grievances, where 
people of different groups get together in the same space, or adopt slogans and symbols that cut 
across social divisions, and; (2.) resistance against the divisive identity frameworks that would 
normally keep these diverse groups apart (Lai, 2020). The interaction of these elements gives 
rise to a situation in which protesters constitute themselves as citizens through protest activity, 
bridging identity-related divisions and producing a new identity of the citizen activist (Lai, 2020). 
The combination of shared aspirations, opportunities for influencing policy-making, and 
resistance against the failures of political elites to address shared concerns, allows for civic 
solidarity to be put into practice (Lai, 2020). Everyday acts of reconciliation embedded in a 
civic ethos can be important in preventing the recurrence of violence, reducing 
inflammatory ethno-nationalist practices, and promoting inter-group reconciliation 
(Visoka, 2020). 
Larger political protests have taken place throughout BiH, beginning from the late 2000s 
onwards. Dosta! (‘Enough!’) emerged as a citizen movement, aimed at encouraging citizens to 
become involved in social and political life. This mobilisation, initially organised by NGOs Dosta! 
and Grozd (‘Grape’), adopted values of solidarity and social justice and aimed at re-politicising 
the public sphere. The work of cultural and youth centres, alongside citizen initiatives such as 
Dosta!, culminated in public manifestations of discontent with protests erupting in Sarajevo in 
early 2008 (Belloni, 2020; Sircar, 2019). At this time, Sarajevo experienced a wave of juvenile 
crimes which ultimately resulted in the murder of a 17-year-old boy. Several thousands of 
Sarajevans took to the streets and demanded the improvement of the security situation. The 
protestors co-ordinated through a ‘loose collective’ called Građani Sarajeva (‘Citizens of 
Sarajevo’), which later became Akcija Građana (‘Citizens’ Action’). This was the first notable non-
ethnic mobilisation in post-war BiH and had the effect of framing and empowering the ‘citizen’, 
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with the rediscovery of agency (Belloni, 2020; Sircar, 2019). The protestors’ complaints 
rapidly evolved to include shared dissatisfaction with ruling elites in addressing the 
socio-economic situation, identifying elites as the immediate cause of their misfortune, 
rather than the ‘other’ ethnic group. The mobilisation called for the resignation of the cantonal 
government (Belloni, 2020; Sircar, 2019).  
In June 2013, an important wave of protests took place throughout BiH, motivated by widely held 
frustrations over political deadlock and bureaucratic red tape that delayed newborns from 
receiving their personal identification numbers in a timely manner (Belloni, 2020; Milan, 2017). 
This cause garnered immense public support for the protesters, who numbered in the thousands, 
representing again the existence of non-ethnic solidarity at a massive scale (Belloni, 2020). In an 
effort to keep the protests independent from interference by political parties and other 
formal organisations, movement organisers framed their actions with a civic meaning, 
focusing on the right to citizenship7 (Belloni, 2020; Milan, 2017). Politicians eventually 
adopted a new version of the law which enabled the issuance of ID numbers (Belloni, 2020). 
In February 2014, protests began in Tuzla, BiH, led by laid-off factory workers – amidst high 
levels of unemployment in the country, particularly among young people (Belloni, 2020; Milan, 
2017). These socio-economic protests quickly spread to other major urban centres, including 
Sarajevo, Mostar, Bihać, Bugojno, Travnik and Goražde, becoming the biggest popular 
mobilisation since the beginning of the 1992-1995 war (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). The protests in 
the Bosniak-Croat Federation involved people of different backgrounds, including Bosniaks, 
Croats, and Serbs, and people who do not affiliate with the three ‘constituent peoples’ (Lai, 
2020). The protests also involved different generations – the young with few job prospects and 
older workers (Lai, 2020). They did not target any particular political party or politician but 
expressed the deeper grievances and frustrations against the entire political class (Belloni, 
2020). Three days into the protests, Governments of Zenica-Doboj Canton, Tuzla Canton, and 
Sarajevo Canton resigned, followed by the resignation of the Una-Sana Canton Government a 
few days later (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). Although the Republika Srpska (RS) remained largely 
protest-free, opinion polls conducted shortly after the first wave of violence indicated high levels 
of support in both entities (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). 
Ultimately, anti-government momentum was difficult to maintain due to a combination of media 
and police pressure and diversion of attention to the devastating floods in May of that year 
(Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). There is, however, evidence that contact established through 
protesting, meetings and volunteering have helped to forge civic solidarity and establish 
activist networks that persist (Lai, 2020). This network of activist groups could constitute the 
basis for the next wave of mobilisation (Lai, 2020). 
Similar to the prior protests, the participation of protestors as private citizens contributed to the 
‘civic’ character of the protests (Lai, 2020). Research on protests in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica 
reveal that protestors identified social justice as the primary aim of the protests, which resonated 
with the population and fostered shared aspirations and solidarity across the ethno-national 
divide (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020; Milan, 2017). This signalled the emergence of alternative forms 
of political practices (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). Activists voiced an independent, third vision of the 
 
7 The primacy of citizenship over ethnonationality as a unifying identity was evident on a placard carried 
throughout Sarajevo, which read: ‘Neither Serbs, Croats nor Bosniaks. Citizens above all’ (Milan, 2017). 
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state as serving socio-economic needs and guaranteeing the social rights of all its constituents, 
independent of ethnicity (Puljek-Shank & Fritsch, 2019).  
There are thus both horizontal and vertical dimensions at play. In the horizontal dimension, 
grassroots level, socioeconomic protests build civic solidarity through socialisation and 
shared aspirations; in the vertical dimension, activists build solidarity because they are 
pitted against a ruling elite that refuses to address their economic concerns (Lai, 2020). At 
the same time, however, elites try to prevent opposition. Combined with an institutional system 
that encourages ethnicity-based electoral politics, elite discourses pose a great challenge to 
the process of building civic solidarity, and thus to reconciliation more broadly (Lai, 2020). 
Political elites tried to defuse momentum during the 2014 protests by dividing citizens along 
ethnic lines, while the media reported on the events in a way that supported the elite agenda 
(Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020).  
Structures and institutions 
A key outcome of the 2014 protests was their quick evolution into plenums, established first in 
Tuzla than spreading throughout the country (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020; Milan, 2017). People 
participated in the plenums as ordinary citizens, articulating demands and grievances toward the 
government in a coherent way and engaging in decision-making democratically (Puljek-Shank & 
Fritsch, 2019; Milan, 2017). They constituted another opportunity for inter-ethnic contact, through 
physical presence at the meetings and through the formulation of plenum demands that 
transcended ethnic divisions and focused on citizens as a whole (Lai, 2020). Activists also got 
together to write and distribute flyers, posters and other promotional material about the protests, 
and to create groups and pages on social media (Lai, 2020). These features encouraged citizens 
to see the plenums as a truly civic space where the ethnic divisions enforced by the 
institutional system were suspended (Lai, 2020). They served as an alternative public sphere 
in which criticising ethnic elites became possible (Puljek-Shank & Fritsch, 2019). 
While plenums could involve confrontation and disagreement, they were not attributed to inter-
ethnic tensions (Belloni, 2020; Lai, 2020). When discussions about controversial issues emerged 
at meetings in Zenica, for example, such as the war crimes accusations against Naser Orić (a 
former commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Srebrenica region), the 
ensuing disagreements, while not being resolved or overcome, remained mostly amicable (Lai, 
2020).  
In order to support the plenums and other outlets for civic action, the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute 
of Human Rights – in partnership with the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and 
Foreign Affairs – provided funding to eight informal civic groups throughout BiH8 (Ludwig 
Boltzmann Institute, 2016). Most of the civic groups were able to establish a permanent office, 
which provides the necessary space for events, discussions, and activism. The Plenum of the 
Citizens in Zenica, for example, established its new office in the heart of Zenica, visible and 
available to all citizens, with the hope that more citizens particularly youth will become more 
active in society. Importantly, the space offers much needed space to share ideas without 
fear of recrimination (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, 2016). The Banja Luka Social Centre is also 
an open space for the free exchange of ideas, which is very restricted in the city – offering 
 
8 They are: the Plenum of the citizens in Zenica, Plenum Bosanska Krupa, the Informal Group Srebrenik is ours, 
the Workers’ Union Sindikat Solidarnosti, the Citizens’ Movement Gračanica, Banja Luka Social Centre, the 
Informal Group for Social Justice in Prijedor and the Network 5f7. 
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freedom and space for various activities involving awareness raising, activism, and new 
discourses that deconstruct nationalistic paradigms (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, 2016).  
Such institutional arrangements can contribute to longer-term impacts. In order to promote 
the sustainability of interventions, NDC Sarajevo’s dialogue initiative similarly allowed for crucial 
follow-up in the form of financial support for community actions and the establishment of multi-
ethnic coordination bodies and action groups (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). Members of Nansen 
Coordination Bodies (NCBs) from various areas of public life (e.g. groups of young people, 
teachers and parents) and all ethnic groups were responsible for the identification of local needs 
and ideas for small-scale local projects (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). There have been concerns, 
however, that members of the NCBs did not have a common vision for the long-term impact of 
their activities on a socio-political level (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019).  
Electoral changes 
Socio-political change in the Western Balkans requires a growing critical mass which 
sees the merit in progressive and conciliatory ethnic politics and is capable of side-lining 
divisive ethno-nationalist forces through peaceful and electoral processes (Visoka, 2020; Garson, 
2020).  
A recent study on the protests in BiH finds evidence of a causal link between the 2014 plenums 
and voting behaviour (Sircar, 2019). Specifically, it finds that the plenums have had a 
persistent negative electoral effect on certain parties in the Federation of BiH (Sircar, 
2019). This demonstrates that even under the most difficult circumstances, such as the post-
authoritarian and post-conflict setting of BiH, where elites wield substantial formal and informal 
power and citizens rarely protest, it is still possible for citizen-led mobilisation to trigger electoral 
change (Sircar, 2019). 
Analysis of post-protest municipal elections found that the vote share for the Stranka 
demokratske akcije (SDA) (Party of Democratic Action) – a Bosniak nationalist, conservative 
party – was reduced in places where plenums were established, and increased for Naša Stranka 
(Our Party) – a small, multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan party (Sircar 2019). The study also surprisingly 
finds decreased support for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) – a multi-ethnic, social 
democratic party (Sircar, 2019). One possible explanation for the SDP result is that on average, 
citizens sought justice not by specifically punishing ethno-national political parties, but rather 
parties with the highest support in the previous pre-plenum election (Sircar, 2019). 
6. Activism through media  
Study A finds that media and performance activities are particularly geared to reaching a 
wide audience, exposing them to themes of inter-group tolerance and cooperation 
(McKone, 2015). Study B also suggests that the use of media and communications technologies 
can serve as broad-based approaches that engage participants across multiple communities and 
regions, as well as nation-wide (Jean, 2019). Various projects surveyed in Study A worked solely 
through media to broadcast information on specific themes to sensitise people to new ideas and 
to multiple perspectives on contentious issues (McKone, 2015).  
Radio shows disseminated information about past atrocities, for example, and highlighted 
potential areas and reasons for inter-group cooperation (McKone, 2015). Documentary film 
projects reported on successful reconciliation processes and portrayed people from each side of 
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the divide doing something different and more positive than the stereotypes of the ‘other’ 
(McKone, 2015). This included portrayal of moral exemplars, offering footage and testimonials of 
people from different ethnic groups helping each other during the conflict (McKone, 2015). 
Another film documented inter-group encounters and dialogue sessions so that the audience 
could see what such exchanges are like (McKone, 2015). If media throughout the Balkans 
were to give attention to positive stories such as the relationships forged through 
reconciliation-related initiatives, there could be an echo effect of more projects that could 
raise awareness and create momentum for sustainable change (Dorokhina et al., 2011). 
One film project surveyed also created a magazine and journal to reach a wider audience 
(McKone, 2015). Live performances, such as theatre productions, concerts, and other cultural 
events, were also used to expose a larger audience to new ideas about the ‘other’ (McKone, 
2015).  
Journalism and activism 
The media and journalists in the Western Balkans have been a tool of advancing political 
goals before, during and after the wars (Andresen et al., 2017). Findings from a WJS study 
suggest, however, that journalists and editors in Albania, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia perceive 
journalism as embodying values of objectivity, detachment and independence (Andresen et al., 
2017). In addition, they endorse journalistic roles that advocate for education and social 
change, coming closer to an activist role (Andresen et al., 2017). Strategies that can be 
employed by journalists include fostering resistance to pressure from outside and practicing 
independent journalism inside traditional structures of newsrooms (Andresen et al., 2017). 
A study of journalists in Kosovo, based on 2012-2016 WJS data, finds that Kosovar Albanian and 
Kosovar Serb journalists feel pressure not only from editors but also the general public when 
reporting on ‘heroes’ of the conflict (Sweeney et al., 2020). For example, one Serb journalist 
noted that although they wanted to include in their work discussion of conflict victims from all 
ethnic communities, they would be considered a ‘hero’ by the Serb community if they only 
reported on Serbian victims and a ‘traitor’ if they reported on Albanian victims (Sweeney et al., 
2020). 
Kosovar journalists also noted that the media can make bigger contributions to truth-telling, such 
as facilitating discussion on truth commissions (Sweeney et al., 2020). There have been 
successful instances of individual journalists researching and reporting on conflict-related sexual 
violence, contributing to greater acknowledgment of these crimes (Sweeney et al., 2020). In 
addition, a Kosovar Albanian documentary filmmaker finds that media has been instrumental in 
investigating and acknowledging the misdeeds even of figures considered as ‘heroes’ of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Sweeney et al., 2020). 
Activism through social media 
The mere presence of alternative options provided by various spaces and initiatives – including 
new online platforms and forms of social media – maintains the potential for active citizenship 
and for a more diverse, inclusive society (Fairey & Kerr, 2020; Howell, 2015). The use of 
hashtags, for example, has gained prominence in the growing phenomena of online 
commemoration and online memory activism (Fridman, 2021). In Serbia, research finds 
evidence of an increase in the use of hashtags on social media platforms by local memory 
activists addressing the contested pasts in the region, as well as the appearance of online 
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commemorations. They serve as a supplement rather than replacement for onsite activism and 
onsite commemorations (Fridman, 2021). 
White armband day 
In May 2012, Emir Hodžić, a Prijedor-born survivor and activist, stood on the main square on his 
own with a white armband to protest the local authorities' denial of non-Serbs' right to remember 
through a ban on commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the events of 1992.9 The photo of 
this act of civil disobedience went viral on social media and was integrated into the global social 
media campaign ‘Stop Genocide Denial’ (Fridman & Ristić, 2020; Paul, 2020). This online 
commemoration emerged from the work of a core group of local memory activists who used 
social media to mobilise a trans-national memory network to combat denial of crimes committed 
in Prijedor in 1992 (Fridman & Ristić, 2020; Paul, 2020). Adopting the use of the hashtag 
#whitearmbandday, pre-existing transitional justice networks consisting of local, regional, and 
international NGOs, legal and educational institutions, and human rights activists mobilised 
people world-wide to show their solidarity by wearing a white armband on 31 May and sending a 
message against genocide denial (Fridman & Ristić, 2020; Paul, 2020). Alongside posting their 
own photos, some participants shared personal stories, family narratives, and memories related 
to Prijedor (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). As this online commemoration gained more visibility 
over time, traditional media continually reported on the events, which further enhanced 
the visibility of commemorations far beyond the core group of initial organisers (Fridman 
& Ristić, 2020). 
Research on #whitearmbandday finds that this form of online trans-national commemoration has 
great significance for memory politics beyond the local and national levels, involving thousands 
of people across borders, languages, and ethno-nationalities (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). It has 
also enabled and created the space for new alternative memories of war that transcend 
ethnicisation of victims to emerge and gain visibility (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). By choosing 
to remember the killed children from the ‘other’ ethnic group, for example, the organisers of 
‘White Armband Day’ created a platform for shared remembrance and inclusion, rather than 
politicisation of victims’ ethnicity (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). Respondents noted the contrast 
between annual commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide in Potočari and the online and 
onsite commemorations in Prijedor, the latter of which they considered less politicised and more 
reflective of the concept of citizenship (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). Not all victims support such 
trans-ethnic commemorations, however. There were an increasing number of Bosniak diaspora 
Facebook pages after 2015, for example, dedicated to the exclusive commemoration of Bosniak 
victims (Fridman & Ristić, 2020).  For further discussion on ‘White Armband Day’, see the section 
on ‘Memorialisation’ in the companion piece on Transitional justice and reconciliation in the 
Western Balkans.10 
The importance of social media extends beyond a platform for activism and serves also 
as a source of knowledge and information about the wars of the 1990s (Fridman & Ristić, 
2020). Further, online commemoration has over time enabled once-banned onsite 
 
9 The white armband is reminiscent of the order given in 1992 to non-Serbian communities in the town of Prijedor 
in Bosnia to mark their houses with white strips and put a white band on their left arms. On 23 May 2012, twenty 
years following the initial decree about white armbands, the local government denied activist Emir Hodžić a 
permit to organise an art installation commemorating female victims from Prijedor (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). 
10 Haider, H. (2021). Transitional justice and reconciliation in the Western Balkans: approaches, impact and 
challenges. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
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commemorations to take place, demonstrating the interconnectivity between online transnational 
commemorations and onsite local ones (Fridman & Ristić, 2020).11  
Online memory activism is significant not only in BiH, but has the potential to support broader 
regional change through the creation of a post-Yugoslav region of memory that places victims at 
the centre of commemorative events and practices, irrespective of ethno-nationality (Fridman & 
Ristić, 2020). This can counter everyday nationalism in the region and bring together 
alternative regional memories that are closely intertwined (Fridman & Ristić, 2020).  
Young memory activists throughout the former Yugoslavia have protested the return to the region 
of ICTY convicts who had completed their sentences and reclaimed roles in public life (see 
section above on ‘civic action and citizenship’). In addition to in-person obstruction, resistance 
has also taken the form of a regional social media hashtag campaign – #NisuNašiHeroji 
(#NotOurHeroes) – adopted by members of the regional YIHR. Their online memory activism 
emphasises that although they are too young to remember the wars, these ICTY convicts 
are not the heroes of their generation (Fridman, 2021). In 2017, when the ICTY was closing, the 
group posted a composition of five pictures of their activists standing in well-known public 
locations in the capitals of five Western Balkan states, holding banners with their hashtag 
#NisuNašiHeroji (in Kosovo translating the hashtag into Albanian) (Fridman, 2021). By adopting 
the same message and the same hashtag in their online and onsite actions, these youth activists 
highlight that theirs is not only a national struggle but a regional one (Fridman, 2021). 
7. Involvement of local leaders  
Individuals, communities, and local organisations are affected by the positive and negative 
consequences of government policies and programmes (McKone, 2015). In order to achieve 
genuine, sustainable social or political change, civil society-based activities need to connect with 
the policies and processes at higher institutional, decision-making and leadership levels (Garson, 
2017; McKone, 2015). Strategies and efforts for involving local authorities and political 
leaders in reconciliation-related initiatives have the potential to expand the impact of a 
project beyond the direct community participants and to create safe political space for such 
activities (Haider, 2011).  
Study A, for instance, finds that dialogue among local leaders was commonly discussed as a 
prerequisite to broader community dialogue. This is considered to be the case because leaders 
may have the respect and authority needed to introduce and generate support from community 
members; and because some leaders set a precedent for the community (McKone, 2015). The 
theory of change presented here is that if community leaders can come to understand multi-
perspective narratives and experiences through dialogue, they can set a precedent for positive 
inter-group interaction – publicly demonstrating that it is possible and generating views of 
tolerance, peaceful conflict resolution and coexistence (Jean, 2019; McKone, 2015). This, in turn, 
can help to prepare community members for participation in reconciliation-related activities. The 
assumptions behind this theory include that leaders will have the motivation and space to come 
together and the ability to find common ground. In addition, they must have adequate influence to 
promote an alternative narrative and be able to reach a critical mass of people (McKone, 2015).  
 
11 In the transition from the global to the local, the development of the annual onsite commemorations has to 
some extent demobilized the original online activities (Fridman & Ristić, 2020). 
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The involvement of key people and institutions, who are respected and play an important 
role in the everyday life of communities and participants is thus an important factor in the 
design and success of initiatives (Šerá Komlossyová, 2019). They can also pave the way for 
cooperation across multiple levels. NDC Sarajevo, for example, got buy-in from municipality 
councillors of all three major ethnic groups, health and education workers, which enhanced the 
credibility and trustworthiness of – and support given to – the organisation and its programming 
(Šerá Komlossyová, 2019).  One of the project leaders for ‘Imagine Coexistence’ in Prijedor, 
which involved a series of activities designed to achieve exposure to the ‘other’, was a member 
of the municipal assembly. He spoke positively about the benefits of the project to his peers and 
sought to win the backing of the city (Haider, 2011). Open Fun Football Schools in Kosovo, which 
brings together children across the divide, also reached out to municipalities, trainers and 
parents and other stakeholders, actively involving them in the project (Krasniqi and Krasniqi, 
2019). In order to ensure that boys and girls have access to and are able to take part in sporting 
initiatives equally, it was considered essential to identify and bring on board female role models 
as well as key ‘gatekeepers’ who have the potential to constrain female participation (Dorokhina 
et al., 2011). 
Another example of working with municipalities is the case of The Rescuers – an internationally 
touring exhibition, profiling the stories of those who cross the divide to help the ‘other’. Since 
2011, it has travelled to 13 cities across the Balkan region, including Sarajevo, Mostar, Bijeljina, 
Brćko, Bratunac and Srebrenica, each time being displayed in public spaces (Wahlin & Kahn, 
2015). It contains the first-hand testimonies and photographic portraits of rescuers from Rwanda 
(four rescuers), Cambodia (four rescuers), Holocaust Europe (four rescuers) and BIH (ten 
rescuers). This combined local and global context allows for wider discussion of rescuer 
behaviour in BiH within a more positive representative framework (Wahlin & Kahn, 2015). The 
exhibit garnered much publicity from the media, allowing for wider impact. Further, during the 
permission-seeking process, the exhibition became a mechanism for forging stronger 
relationships with local governments, including mayoral offices, and community organisations 
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